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ABSTRACT
An adverse supply shock hits a two-country Mundell-Fleming world and
causes unemployment and a higher cost óf living. The optimal fiscal policies
under non-cooperative and under international policy coordination are
then contrasted when there is either a regime of floating exchange rates, or
a regime of managed exchange rates with hegemony (such as the EMS), or a
symmetric regime of fixed exchange rates (such as the EMU). The welfare loss
depends on unemployment, real income and budgetary imbalance. There is also
an attempt to look at the effects of economic integration ("1992"), of
indexation of wages to the cost of living, and of interactions between
Europe and the US. The results shed some light on the recent proposals of
the Delors Committee for economic and monetary union in Europe.
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The first stage of the proposals for economic and monetary union in
Europe of the Delors Committee has, in principle, been accepted by the
Council of Ministers on 26-27 June 1989 in Madrid. Spain has just joined the
European Monetary System and even the UK has agreed to join as long as the
capital markets of Europe are liberalised by lst July 199o and inflation in
the UK has been cut to the European average. The first stage of the
proposals of the Delors Committee involves a closer convergence and
coordination of the monetary policies of the members of the European
Monetary System, wider use of the ECU, all European currencies to join the
European Monetary System, liberalisation of capital movements in Europe,
completion of the internal market for goods and services by removing
physical, technical and fiscal obstacles to free intra-European trade, and a
doubling of regional and structural funds. Much progress has already been
made on the first stage. The second stage may require a new Treaty of Rome
to delegate the responsibility of monetary policy to a European System of
Central Banks and implies a considerable loss of national sovereignty. The
progress of the first stage will be consolidated and reinforced, the EMS-
bands will be narrowed, and rules for the size and finance of public sector
deficits will be formulated at a European level. In the third and final
stage intra-European exchange rates are irrevocably fixed, the national
currencies are supplemented with, and eventually replaced by, a single
European currency (say, the Monet), the European System of Central Banks
determines the value of the European currency vis-à-vis the dollar and the
yen, national public sector deficits may not be financed by printing money,
there are limits on government borrowing from abroad, and the Council of
Ministers (together with the European Parliament) may adjust the budgets of
national governments when they would otherwise imply a danger for monetary
stability. Although Europe has committed itself to stage one, it is not
at all clear whether all countries (in particular the UK and Denmark) want
to go ahead with stages two and three as this involves too much delegation
of the power to set fiscal and monetary policy to (relatively undemocratic)
European institutions.2
It is, however, clear that European countries will be less able to
conduct an independent monetary policy, because most central banks devote
monetary policy almost exclusively to ensuring a fixed parity of their
exchange rate against the Deutschemark. The experience of the Netherlands
shows that this will be even more so the case for France and Italy when they
remove their controls on international capital movements, because then
realignments of their currencies would lead to speculative attacks which
can no longer be fended off. At the same time, a wider membership of the
European Monetary System and the move towards monetary unification will
weaken German hegemony in monetary policy and lead to a more symmetric
exchange-rate regime in Europe. It is therefore of interest to contrast a
regime of floating exchange rates (such as the period of national money
supply targets for the OECD, 1973-85) with an asymmetric regime of managed
exchange rates (such as the German hegemony under the European Monetary
System, 1979 onwards) and a symmetric regime of fixed exchange-rates (such
as the proposals for monetary union in Europe envisaged by the Delors
Committee). The main problem of fixed exchange rates is that monetary policy
cannot be used to correct for regional imbalances (Goodhart, 1988). If
labour and other markets work perfectly, then unemployment in a particular
region would lead to falling wages in that region until equilibrium has been
restored. In such a situation one can reap all the benefits, in terms of
lower transactions and information costs and reduction in exchange-rate
risk, of a greater common currency a~ea. When there is naminal wage
rigidity, then a loosening of monetary policy and depreciation of the
currency could also generate the additional demand to bring the region back
to full employment. Under an asymmetric or symmetric regime of fixed
exchange rates one cannot rely on this instrument of economic policy and
therefore one has to rely much more on fiscal policy to eliminate regional
imbalances. This seems, from a macroeconomic point of view, the main
disadvantage of fixed exchange rates. An advantage of fixed exchange rates
is that competitive and futile appreciations of the currency, associated
with unilaterally increasing government spending or cutting the money
supply, in order to improve the cost of living at the expense of rival
countries no longer occur. The main objective of this paper is to examine
and contrast the effectiveness, spill-over effects and scope for3
international coordination of fiscal policy under regimes of floating,
managed and fixed exchange rates.
There is by now a very Iarge literature on the international
coordination of monetary policies under alternative exchange-rate regimes,
but very little work has been done on the international coordination of
fiscal policies. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989a) and van der Ploeg (1990)
contrast the setting of monetary policies under floating and under managed
exchange rates. They find that, under the EMS, France and Italy find it
optimal to disinflate away a common adverse supply shock by appreciating
their currency and improving their cost of living at the expense of Germany.
Basevi and Giavazzi (1987) use numerical analysis to show that, even when
the European economies have identical structures, it is not optimal to have
intra-European exchange rates irrevocably fixed. Canzoneri and Gray (1985)
use a standard Mundell-Fleming model with wage indexation and Kenen (1987;
1988) uses a two-country portfolio-balance model to answer the question
which exchange-rate regime alleviates the need for international policy
coordination and finds that the answer depends on both the nature and origin
of the shock. This is a considerable advance over the earlier studies
reported in Buiter and Marston (1985), which use two-country exchange-rate
overshooting models and restrict attention to floating exchange rates.
Hamada (1976) uses the long-run monetary approach to the balance of payments
to show that, in the absence of international policy coordination under
fixed exchange rates, the common inflation rate is too high when the
increase in international reserves exceeds the average of desired balances
of payments. This conflict does not manifest itself under a clean float,
because then each country can conduct an independent monetary policy. None
of the studies discussed in this paragraph are concerned with fiscal policy.
Keen (1989? shows that harmonisation of indirect taxes may in the presence
of trade distortions be Pareto-improving. Frenkel, Razin and Symansky (1989)
also discuss conflicts in tax harmonisation associated with the single
market in Europe of 1992. Razin and Sadka (1989) consider the effects of
integration of international capital markets on the size of government and
on tax coordination. Kehoe (1987) and van der Ploeg (1988) use general
equilibrium models with micro foundations and find that absence of
coordination leads to excessive levels of public spending, because an
increase in public spending has a negative externality as it leads to an4
appreciation of the real exchange rate, a fall in consumption of home goods
by foreign agents and thus a fall in foreign welfare. However, this paper is
concerned with the short-run stabilisation and coordination aspects of
fiscal policy under alternative exchange-rate regimes and in this sense
provides an analytical alternative to the empirical analysis of McKibbin and
Sachs (1986a,b).
Section 2 discusses a short-run Keynesian two-country model with
imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods and with perfect
capital mobility and a welfare function which values full unemployment, high
real income or a low cost of living, and budgetary balance. Section 3 then
considers non-cooperative and cooperative fiscal policy responses to an
adverse supply shock under a clean float. The main insight is that, when
governments attach a relatively high (low) priority to real incomes rather
than to budgetary balance and full employment, they have in the absence of
international policy coordination a too loose (tight) fiscal stance and thus
end up with too high (low) interest rates and too low (high) levels of
unemployment. Section 4 considers the case of the European Monetary System
with German hegemony and shows that a German fiscal expansion is less
effective and less of a locomotive (or even a beggar-thy-neighbour) policy
than a fiscal expansion elsewhere in Europe. Since competitive appreciations
of the currency cannot occur under this international regime, fiscal
policies always tend to be too tight unless there is European coordination
of fiscal policies. In addition, the German fiscal stance is, irrespective
of whether there is international policy coordination, tighter than the
fiscal stance of the rest of Europe, so that Germany cannot be relied upon
to take on the role of a"locomotive engine of growth" for Europe. Section 5
considers the setting of both non-cooperative and cooperative fiscal
policies under a symmetric regime, such as European Monetary Union. The
outcomes now depend on the structural parameters of the economy. Section 6
considers the effects of integration of goods markets in Europe. Section 7
discusses the strategic interactions between a European Monetary Union and
the US and shows that coordination of fiscal policies within Europe can be
counterproductive, because it generates an adverse reaction (in the form of
a tighter fiscal stance) from the US. Section 8 discusses the effects of
wage indexation within Europe and also considers the interactions with the
US. Section 9 concludes the paper.5
2. A short-run Keynesian two-country model
To focus our attention, we will use a standard Keynesian two-country
model of the Mundell-Fleming variety. The model assumes immobility of labour
across national borders and imperfect substitution between home and foreign
goods, so that the "1992" plans for single European markets for goods and
labour have not been fully completed yet. Section 6 examines what happens
when goods and labour markets throughout Europe are integrated. In addition,
the model assumes the liberalisation of financial markets throughout Europe
and, more specifically, perfect capital mobility and equalisation of
interest rates throughout Europe. This is not unreasonable in view of the
decision of the European Community to abolish all forms of controls and
restrictions on international capital movements by lst July 1990. Finally,
the model assumes, for simplicity, static expectationsl. The model can be
summarised by the following equations:
Y--6r f á( P~ } e- p) t f t ~y~ - d, a, b z 0 (2.1)
y~ - -Gr - ó (P~ t e - P) } f~ } ~Y - d~, 0 5 ~ ~ 1 (2.2)
m- p- Y- ar, ~~ 0 (2.3)
m~ - p~ - y~` - ~r (2.4)
Y--~ (w t s- P) ,~ z 0 (2.5)
Y~ - -~ (w~ t s~ - P~)
w-~pc , 0 s~ s 1
(2.6)
(2.7)
1 This assumption precludes an analysis of the counterproductivity of
international policy coordination under floating exchange rates, which
arises from the worsening of credibility vis-à-vis private sector agents
(see Rogoff, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1988).6
w~ - ~ Pc~ (2.8)
Pc -(1-a) P t a(P~`}e) , 0 5 a~ 1
Pc~ - (1-a) P~ } a (P-e)
(2.9)
(2.10)
where y, f, d, r, w, p, pc, s, e and m denote real output, the fiscal
stance, an adverse demand shock, the European interest rate, the nominal
wage rate, the domestic price level, the consumers' price index, an adverse
supply shock, the nominal exchange rate (i.e., the price of foreign exchange
in terms of domestic currency) and the nominal money supply, respectively.
All variables are expressed as percentage deviations from their steady-state
values, except for r which is expressed as an arithmetic deviation from its
steady-state value. Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
Equations (2.1)-(2.2) are the familiar open economy IS-curves and
equations (2.3)-(2.4) are the LM-curves. Combining equations (2.1) and (2.2)
yields the AD-schedule
Y - -6r } b (P~ t e - P) t f } ,yf~` - d - ~d~, (2.11)
where ~- G~(1-~), ~- b~(lt~), d- d~(1-~-2) and f- f~(1-~2). Equations
(2.5)-(2.6) show aggregate supply as a decreasing function of unit labour
cost, so that s can be interpreted as an adverse shock to the prcductivity
of labour. Of course, s can also be interpreted as a fall in the capital
stock or an increase in the price of raw materials ( e.g, oil). Equations
2.~)-(2.8 show that wa es are 2 ( ) g partially indexed to the cost of living .
Finally, equations (2.j)-(2.10) show that the cost of living is a weighted
average of home and foreign prices where a denotes the value share of
imports in total expenditures. Equations {2.5)-(2.10) can be combined to
give the AS-schedule,
2 It is straightforward to allow for wages to also depend on employment or
output, but this does not change the qualitative conclusions of the
results.7
Y - ~ [(1-~)(m}~r) - ~a(p~ } e - p) - s] (2.12)
where ~-~j[lt~ (1-~)] ~ 0, at~d real income, c~,
w- w- pc --(1-~) pc --(1-~)Cm t~s } a(lts) (P~` t e- p) t~r]~
Clt~(1-~)]. (2.13)
A high interest rate or a high money supply leads, when there is some
nominal wage rigidity, to an excess supply of money, which exerts an upward
pressure on prices, erodes the real value of the wage and thus boosts the
demand for labour and aggregate supply. When wages are indexed to the cost
of living, an appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces import prices
and wages and thus boosts aggregate supply.
There is some reason to believe that, in contrast to the US, wages are
fully indexed to the cost of living in Europe (Branson and Rotemberg, 1980;
Bruno and Sachs, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1987). This implies that ~-1 and thus
real incomes are unaffected by policy and exogenous shocks (c~-0) and
monetary policy does not affect output and feeds directly into prices and
wages. However, there is some evidence that in recent years there has been a
significant degree of nominal wage rigidity in Europe (Gordon, 1987;
Garretsen and Lensink, 1989). In that case ~~1 and adverse supply shocks
lead to less unemployment than under full indexation but do lead to a fall
in real income. The analysis of Sections 3-7 assumes zero indexation of
wages to the cost of living (~-0) and, for simplicity, a constant mark-up in
price-setting (~-1), whilst Section 8 considers the case of full indexation
(~-1).
Section 3 considers a clean float, where the exchange rate adjusts to
clear the balance of payments and the monetary stance in both countries is
fixed (m-m~-0). Section 4 considers the European Monetary System, where
there is a fixed intra-European exchange rate and a stable German money
supply (e-m~`-0) and the money supplies of the rest of Europe (m) have become
endogenous. Section 5 considers European Monetary Union, which implies an
irrevocably fixed intra-European exchange rate and a stable European money
supply (e-mE-~(mtm~)-0).The home government chooses its fiscal stance to minimise its welfare
loss,
Min W-~(Y-Yd)2 t~81(~-~d)2 t~82f2, ~1. 82 z 0,
f
(2.14)
and similarly for the foreign government, where yd denotes the desired
(full-employment) level of output and wd denotes the desired level of real
income. The adverse effects of a fiscal expansion are higher budget
deficits, which to the extent that they may eventually be financed by
increases in monetary growth have an adverse effect on inflation.
Alternatively, governments simply dislike high budget deficits for reasons
of political economy. This seems to be the case for most governments
throughout the OECD region as most seem to want to balance their books.
Hence, the policy dilemma of each government is that they want a high level
of government spending for high activity and, through an appreciation of the
real exchange rate, high real income, but that they want a low level of
government spending for budgetary balance and~or low inflation.
Exogenous demand shocks can, as long as they are observable, be
immediately off-set by changes in fiscal policy, hence we will concentrate
on the effects of a supply shock (d-d~-0). A common adverse supply shock
(s-s~~0) leaves the exchange rate and money supplies unaffected, reduces
employment and output (y--o~s~[o}p(1-~)~]~0) and also reduces real income
(w--(1-~)(6t~)~s~[otp(1-~)a]~0). Since it is a common supply shock, these
effects are independent of what kind of exchange-rate regime prevails. It
follows that the targets for full employment and real income are given by yd
- G~S~LGts(1-~)~] ~ 0 and wd -(1-~)(~t~)~ s~[Gfs(1-~)~7 ~ 0, respectively.
Under real wage rigidity (~-1) supply shocks have a greater effect on
unemployment than under nominal wage rigidity (~-0), but no effect on real
income. Hence, wage indexation cushions real incomes against adverse supply
shocks but this has the disadvantage that more unemployment is caused by
adverse supply shocks.9
3. Floating exchange rates
Equating aggregate demand, (2.11), with aggregate supply, (2.12}, gives
equilibrium in the goods market (GME) and yields the GME-locus.
Intersection with the GME~-locus yields the world interest rate and the real
exchange rate, c:
r- r~ -~[(1}~)(ftf~`) - m t s- m~ t s~~~(6t~) (3.1)
c- P~ t e- P-~[m-m~ t s~-s f (1-~}(f~-f)~~á (3.2}
when ~-0 and 5-1. Upon substitution of (3.1)-(3.2) into (2.12) and (2.13)
one obtains expressions for output and real income:
y - ~ [(2cs t ~) (m-s) - ~(m~`-s~) t (lt~) ~(ftf~)7~(cst~) (3.3)
w - -s - ~(a~á) [m-m~` t s~-s t (1-~)(f~-f)~. (3.4)
An increase in the home money supply leads to an increase in prices
and, given a rigid nominal wage, a fall of the real wage, so that aggregate
supply is boosted. The increase in liquidity leads to a fall in the home
interest rate, which eliminates the excess supply of home goods. The
incipient capital outflows cause a depreciation of the exchange rate. The
excess demand for foreign goods, caused by the fall in world interest rates,
is thus choked off by a fall in net exports of the foreign country, induced
by an appreciation of the foreign real exchange rate. A monetary expansion
has a negative effect on foreign employment and output and is thus a beggar-
thy-neighbour policy, which is the familiar Mundell-Fleming result. The
increase in home prices reduces real income and the depreciation of the real
exchange rate leads to an increase in import prices and thus to a further
reduction in home real income and an increase in foreign real income. It is
clear that, under nominal wage rigidity, an adverse supply shock has exactly
the same effects as a contraction of the money supply and thus increases
interest rates, worsens competitiveness and reduces employment at home
whilst it increases employment and diminishes real income abroad. However,
the fall in real income caused by higher domestic prices is mitigated by10
lower import prices induced by the appreciation of the real exchange rate.
In fact; an adverse supply shock worsens real income when a~2b is satisfied.
A fiscal expansion leads, as it is assumed to be financed by bonds, to
a rise in interest rates. To choke off the incipient capital inflows, the
real exchange rate appreciates. These effects mean that part of the fiscal
demand expansion is crowded out by a fall in consumption, investment and
net exports. (For a small open economy this makes fiscal policy completely
ineffective.) The fall in net exports boosts foreign employment and output.
This dominates the fall in foreign consumption and investment arising from a
higher world interest rate, so that a fiscal expansion is a locomotive
policy. In fact, in this symmetric world, the employment multipliers for
home and foreign fiscal policy are exactly the same. The appreciation of the
real exchange rate reduces the cost of living at home and increases it
abroad, so that real income increases at home and falls abroad. A global
fiscal expansion leaves the real exchange rate and thus the cost of living
and real income in both countries unaffected. It raises the world interest
rate, so that consumption and investment throughout the world fall and thus
world output increases by less than the full amount of the fiscal expansion.
Now consider the optimal determination of the fiscal stance, problem
(2.14) subject to (3.3)-(3.4), when the countries do not engage in
international policy coordination and when they are hit by a common adverse
supply shock (s-s~~0). Under a non-cooperative float, the reaction function
is downward-sloping when the real-income or cost-of-living target has a low
priority relative to the target of full employment. The reason is that, when
the foreign government engages in a fiscal expansion, then home employment
increases so that the home government can afford to pay more attention to
the objective of maintaining budgetary balance. Conversely, when the real-
income target has a high priority relative to the full-employment target,
the reaction function is upward-sloping. The reason is that a foreign fiscal
expansion leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and a fall in
real income, so that the home government wishes to expand demand in order to
appreciate the real value of its currency and reduce the cost of living.
Hence, under a non-cooperative float, governments who care relatively more
about the cost of living and are faced with a fiscal expansion abroad,11
respond with a fiscal expansion whilst governments who care more about full
employment respond with a fiscal contraction. The former case corresponds to
((lt ) á~ 1 gl ~ la 1-~. Gt~ J
2
(3.5)
whilst the latter case corresponds to the opposite. Intersection of the
reaction curves for the home and foreign governments yields the non-
cooperative (Nash-Cournot) outcome for a regime of floating exchange rates
(denoted by the subscripts NF):
~ Yd} 91 ~a(1-y)~b] ~d
~ -
fNF - fNF - ~2 } 2~ ~ 0
2
wNF - ~NF~ - C ~ ~




Under a non-cooperative float each of the countries is, through an increase
in the fiscal stance, able to alleviate some of the fall in employment and
output, caused by the common adverse supply shock, but none of the countries
is able to soften the fall in real income.
International policies coordination corresponds in this symmetric world
to jointly choosing the fiscal stances to minimise the global welfare loss
(WfW~). Such a cooperative float (denoted by the subscripts CF) internalises
the international externalities and yields the following outcomes:
d
~ - y Y fCF - fCF - 2 ~ 0
ó } ~2
~CF - wCF~ - ~ ~ wd
~ " d d





When, under a cooperative float, governments do not care about budgetary
balance (g2-0), then full employment is achieved. In general, not all
unemploymer,t will be alleviated as governments do not want to have too large
deficits.
A comparison of the non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes under a
clean float yields:
Proposition 1: Right-wing governments attach a relatively high priority to
real incomes and the cost of living rather than to budgetary balance and
full employment, i.e., the inequality
gl ~a(1-~)~b~~d ~ g2 ~ Yd~(~2 } 92) (3.12)
holds, and have in the absence of international policy coordination under a
clean float a too loose fiscal stance and thus end up with too high interest
rates and excessively large levels of employment and output (fNF~fCF)'
Left-
wing governments pay more attention to full employment and budgetary balance
than to real income, i.e., (3.12) is violated (low gl, and ~d, high g2 and
d
y), and thus have in the absence of international policy coordination a too
tight fiscal stance leading to excessive unemployment (fNF~fCF)'
Clearly, international policy coordination under a clean float leads
right-wing governments to tighten their fiscal stance and left-wing
governments to loosen their fiscal stance. The reason is that international
policy coordination leads right-wing governments to internalise the adverse
consequences of a fiscal expansion on foreign real income and left-wing
governments to internalise the beneficial effects on foreign employment and
output.
4. German hegemony and the European Monetary System
This Section assumes that the Bundesbank, the foreign central bank,
sets the monetary policy for the whole of Europe and that the other central
banks of Europe peg their currencies to the Deutschemark (e-0). Hence, the
Bundesbank sticks to a stable money supply (m~-0) and the other central
banks give up control of their own money supply. Such an asymmetric regime13
of fixed exchange rates is in accordance with the view that the European
Monetary System operates a greater Deutschemark-zone; for a discussion of
the evidence on this view see Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989b) 3. It is
assumed that all controls on international movements of financial assets
within Europe are abolished. This is already the case for the Netherlands,
but the European Community has decided that eight member countries should
have fully liberalised capital movements by lst July 199o and the other
countries will follow suit. Since it is then more difficult to use capital
controls for fending off speculative attacks on the currency, as France and
Italy have done on occasion in the past, it is reasonable to assume that
exchange-rate realignments will occur less frequently (and that e-0). The
non-German, i.e. home, money supplíes (m) are endogenous in this asymmetric
exchange-rate regime. The mechanism is as follows. If there is pressure on
the home currency to depreciate against the Deutschemark arising from a
balance-of-payments deficit with Germany, then the home central banks sell
marks in exchange for home currency in order to defend their exchange rates
and to enable non-German households to import the goods they want. It
follows that a balance-of-payments deficit causes an equal reduction in the
money supply, so that the non-German central banks cannot conduct an
independent monetary policy. For example, it is almost impossible for the
Dutch central bank to conduct an independent monetary policy as long as it
firmly pegs the guilder to the Deutchemark. It is of course possible to
sterilise the effects of the balance of payments on the money supply through
open-market operations, but this cannot be done for very long and is not
considered here.
To gain an understa~ding of the interdependence of fiscal polícies in
the European Monetary System, equations (3.1)-(3.4) can be rewritten as:
r- r~ -[-áe - m~ t~f t f~ t~s t (1-á) s~~~(Gt~) (4.1)
m- m~ t 2S e t(1-~) (f-f~) t(1-25) (s-s~) (4.2)
3 In a similar vain it can be argued that the Gold Standard was
characterised by UK hegemony and Bretton Woods by US hegemony.14
Y - {om~ } [(1-~)6t~]f - [(1-~)0 - ~~Jf~ } (26t~)b (e-s)
- [(1-2á)o - b~7s~}i(o}~)
Y~ - [6m~ t ~(~f } f~) - ~~ (e-s) - (~}~~)s~J~(6t~)
~ - - (1-a)s - a(s~te}





An increase in the German money supply (m~T) leads to an equal increase
in, say, the French money supply, because the French defend themselves
against an appreciating currency by selling francs. The fall in European
interest rates and the associated boost in consumption and investment
throughout Europe is thus twice as large as under a clean float. With a
fixed exchange rate, there is no beneficial effect on German net exports and
therefore unemployment falls by the same amount throughout Europe. Hence, a
monetary expansion is now a locomotive (rather than a begger-thy-neighbour)
policy. A devaluation of, say, the franc (eT) boosts net exports to Germany,
which causes an increase in German unemployment and a fall in French
unemployment. To choke off the resulting excess supply of money in Germany,
European interest rates fall. Since in addition the French money supply
increases, the increase in French employment exceeds the fall in Germany
employment. A devaluation is thus a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, but note
that it increases the cost of living at home and reduces it abroad. A French
adverse supply shock leads to an appreciation of the French real exchange
rate and thus has the same effects on German and French employment, output
and interest rates as an appreciation of the franc, hence it increases
European interest rates and French unemployment and reduces German
unemployment. However, a German adverse supply shock increases German
unemployment, but (if S~~) the adverse effects of the fall in the French
money supply may outweigh the beneficial effects of the depreciation of the
French real exchange rate on French unemployment. Both a French and a German
adverse supply shock reduce real incomes throughout Europe.
A joint físcal expansion leaves the intra-European real exchange rates
unaffected and thus leads to the same expansion of employment and output as15
under a clean float. A fiscal expansion in Germany or elsewhere in Europe
can under managed exchange rates no longer affect intra-European - real
exchange rates and thus cannot affect the cost of living and real income at
home and abroad, so that competitive appreciations of the currency can not
occur. This is one of the main reasons why a regime of managed exchange
rates may be superior to floating exchange rates. A French bond-financed
fiscal expansion is, as far as German employment and output are concerned, a
locomotive policy. The mechanism is that the greater increase in French
income boosts net exports from Germany to France. The resulting excess
demand for German money is choked off by a rise in German and French
interest rates, which leads to some crowding out of consumption and
investment throughout Europe. The excess demand for French goods is
accommodated by an increase in the French money supply, rather than by an
appreciation of the franc as under a clean float. However, a German fiscal
expansion now has ambiguous effects on employment and output in the rest of
Europe. The negative effect arises from the non-German central banks having
to defend their currencies by buying them up, as there is an upward pressure
on the Deutschemark. This reduces the non-German money supplies, raises
European interest rates and thus crowds out employment and output in Germany
and the rest of Europe. The positive effect arises from the fall in German
net exports, which boosts employment and output in the rest of Europe. The
net effect is ambiguous, but when 6~~~ a German fiscal expansion is a
beggar-thy-neighbour policy and otherwise it is a locomotive policy4. The
effect of a German fiscal expansion on German employment is less than the
effect of a French fiscal expansion on French employment.
Now consider the optimal setting of fiscal policies under both a non-
cooperative and a cooperative European Monetary System (denoted by the
subscripts NM and CM, respectively). Under non-cooperative decisionmaking,
the reaction function of the German fiscal authorities is always downward-
sloping:
4 McKibbin and Sachs (1986b) argue that, when the French use their fiscal
policy instruments to peg the franc to the Deutschemark, then a German
fiscal expansion is always a locomotive policy.16
~ -
fNM -
(~}~, CYd- ë [~}~, f]
~ 2
CGt~J } g2 ~
(4.7)
which follows from ~W~~~f~-0. The reason is that a fiscal expansion in the
rest of Europe boosts German employment, so that the German Treasury can
afford to pay more attention to the target of budgetary balance. The
reaction function for the rest of Europe is given by:
fNM -
~(1-~)~ } ~l [Yd t C(1-~)a - ó~)lf~]
óta 1 6t~ J
r(1-~,6 t ~12
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and is downward-sloping (upward-sloping) when a German fiscal expansion is a
locomotive (beggar-thy-neighbour) policy, i.e., when [~~~r~] is less
(greater) than unity. Intersection of the reaction functions for Germany and
the rest of Europe yields the non-cooperative (or Nash-Cournot) outcome.
When a German fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy, it seems likely that
absence of European coordination of fiscal policies leads to a too tight
fiscal stance throughout Europe (as the beneficial effects of a fiscal
expansion on foreign unemployment are not internalised). A too loose fiscal
stance is unlikely, because competitive, futile appreciations of the
exchange rate through increases in government spending are ruled out under
the European Monetary System. On the other hand, when a German fiscal
expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, then the German fiscal stance is
too loose whilst the fiscal stance of the rest of Europe is too tight
relative to the cooperative outcome, because Germany ignores the adverse
effects of a loose fiscal stance on the rest of Europe whilst the rest of
Europe ignores the beneficial effects of a loose fiscal stance on Germany.
The cooperative fiscal stance does not, in general, coincide for Germany and
the rest of Europe. In fact, Germany is both under a cooperative and under a
non-cooperative regime of managed exchange rates likely to have a tighter
fiscal stance than the rest of Europe.
In order to gain a better understanding of the above propositions, it
is useful to present a few numerical examples rather than a lot of17
cumbersome algebra. Let 6-0.5, ~-0.5, ~-0.5, a-0.8 and ~-2 be one set of
parameter values, so that ~-1, ~-1;'3 and a German fiscal expansion is a
locomotive policy (~~~~). Table 1 shows the results. Because German fiscal
policy is less powerful than, say, French fiscal policy, both under a
cooperative and under a non-cooperative European Monetary System Germany has
a tighter fiscal stance than the rest of Europe. In addition, as the
beneficial effects of a fiscal expansion on foreign activity are not
internalised, absence of international policy coordination in the European
Monetary System leads to too tight fiscal stances and thus to too much
unemployment throughout Europe. German hegemony in monetary policy implies
that the European Monetary System operates as a greater Deutschemark zone
and that Germany cannot be relied upon to be a"locomotive engine of growth"
that pulls Europe out of a recession. Nevertheless, a regime of managed
exchange rates may be preferable to a clean float, as it makes competitive
and futile attempts to reduce the cost of living at the expense of rival
countries impossible. Proposition 1 shows that this argument is particularly
relevant for right-wing governments who attach a relative high priority to
the cost of living rather than to full employment and budgetary balance (as
is the case in Table 1). A non-cooperative European Monetary System leads to
lower deficits than a non-cooperative float, because the adverse externality
of a fiscal expansion on foreign real income is eliminated. Hence, in the
absence of cooperation, the European Monetary System has a built-in
deflationary bias whilst a clean float leads, for right-wing governments, to
too loose fiscal stances. The welfare ranking in decreasing order is EMS
with cooperation, floating exchange rates with cooperation, EMS without
cooperation and floating exchange rates without cooperation. Hence, the
European Monetary System seems, for common supply shocks and right-wing
goverments, a better alternative than floating exchange rates. However, in
this locomotive example Germany has an incentive to cooperate in the EMS
whilst the rest of Europe has no such incentive. Hence, the maximisation of
European welfare (-(WtW~`)) is not Pareto-efficient and therefore can only be
sustained when Germany offers side-payments to the rest of Europe.
In order to see what happens when, under the EMS, a German fiscal
expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, Table 2 presents a numerical
example with a smaller effect of foreign real income on aggregate demand
(~-0.1 so that ~~~~). The main difference with the locomotive case is that,18
under a non-cooperative European Monetary system, Germany pursues a too
loose fiscal stance (as it ignores the adverse consequences on the rest of
Europe) and is slightly worse off than the rest of Europe. Comparison of
Tables 1 and 2 suggests that more intra-European trade carries the danger
that Germany does not fulfil its role of a"locomotive engine of growth".
5 A symmetric regime of fixed exchange rates: European Monetary Union
The Delors Committee has made proposals for three concrete steps
towards economic and monetary union in Europe. One of these proposals is the
founding of a European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which is to ensure
that intra-European exchange rates are irrevocably fixed (e-0) and to
determine the joint monetary policy for the whole of Europe 5. Obviously,
when there is a single currency (if necessary, in parallel to the various
national currencies), problems of speculative attacks and balance-of-
payments crises, which occur from time to time under the European Monetary
Union, disappear. One of the stated principles of a European Monetary Union
is that there should be no German or any other hegemony in the formulation
of monetary policies, so that the task of maintaining fixed intra-European
exchange rates is carried out by all European central banks including the
Bundesbank and that the European money supply, mE- ~(m}m~), should be
determined by the ESCB or a European Central Bank. In other words, the ESCB
should operate as a symmetric regime of fixed exchange rates 6. The loss
of German hegemony in monetary policy may lead to a loss of credibility as
the reputation and discipline of the Bundesbank will be diminished by the
5 Such a system is technically similar to McKinnon's proposal for a return
to fixed nominal exchange rates and global monetarism, which involves
cooperation among the central banks to set monetary policy in such a way as to
achieve a target growth rate for global nominal income.
6 Gros and Lane (1989) suggest that tightening of exchange-rate bands
leads to more intervention by all members, even if the formal
responsibility for keeping exchange rates within the band lies with the
peripheral countries. Hence, as progess is made on the proposals of
the Delors Committee, one can expect German hegemony to become less
important and the European exchange-rate system to become more symmetric.19
French, Italians and British in a European System of Central Banks, and thus
to a higher average rate of inflati~n for Europe (cf., Melitz, 1988). This
potential disadvantage of a European Monetary Union is not further discussed
here. Although the Delors Committee recommends national guidelines for
public sector borrowing requirements to be determined by the ESCB in a
cooperative fashion, both non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes for
fiscal policies under a European Monetary System will be considered. It will
be a long time before the completion of a common European market is
achieved, so here it is still assumed that there are separate markets
(imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods) and the effects of
economic integration are discussed in Section 6.
The reduced-form of the model under European Monetary Union can be
summarised by (4.5), (4.6),
r- r~ -~[(lt~)(ftf~) - 2mE t s t s~~~(ot~). (5.1)
y- [o~~l [mE - ~(sts~`)~ t b(s~` t e- s) }~(12 G~~} 2~J
f t J
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m- mE t Se t~(1-~) (f-f~) t~(1-2b) (s-s~), (5.3)
m~ - mE - ~e - ~(1-~) (f-f~) - ~(1-2b) (s-s~), (5.4)
where mE and e are the policy instruments of the ESCB and f and f~ are the
instruments of the Treasuries of the sovereign member states. An expansion
of the European money supply under monetary union has exactly the same
effects on European interest rates and levels of activity as a joint
expansion of money supplies under a clean float or an expansion of the
German money supply under a European Monetary System. The effects of
common demand or supply shocks are also independent of what kind of
exchange-rate regime prevails.
An idiosyncratic adverse supply shock leads to an appreciation of the
real exchange rate of the country concerned and an increase in European
interest rates. The decrease in net exports implies that the adverse effects20
on home activity are always greater than on foreign activity. In fact, if
the expansionary effect of the real exchange rate outweighs the
contractionary effect of the interest rate on foreign activity (if
2~(~t~)~~), then an adverse supply shock has a positive spill-over effect on
foreign employment and output.
A bond-financed fiscal expansion leads to a rise in European interest
rates and thus to a fall in private consumption and investment throughout
Europe. The net effect on home activity is, of course, positive, but foreign
activity can increase or decrease depending on whether the beneficial
effects on net exports outweigh the adverse effects of crowding out (~~2~~)
or not. Hence, under a European Monetary Union a fiscal expansion can, in
contrast to under a clean float, be a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. The
spill-over effect of a fiscal expansion in the rest of Europe on German
activity is less under monetary union than under the European Monetary
System, but the spill-over effect of a German fiscal expansion is greater.
Both a non-cooperative and a cooperative monetary union (denoted by the
subscripts NU and CU, respectively) will be considered. The reaction
function is given by
-
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(5.5)
so that, if a fiscal expansion is a locomotive (beggar-thy-neighbour)
policy, one responds to a fiscal expansion abroad with a fiscal contraction
(expansion) as then relatively more attention must be paid to the target of
budgetary balance (full employment). Intersection of the reaction curves
yields the outcome under a monetary union in the absence of international
coordínation of fiscal policies:
f - f ~- ~(1-~)o t 2~] Yd ~ 0.
NU NU
~(1-~)6 t 2~]~ t 2g2 (6}~)
(5.6)21
International coordination of fiscal policies under a monetary union yields
exactly the same outcome as under a regime of floating exchange rates
(fCU-fCF)~
hence one obtains the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When a fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy under monetary
union (2~~)6), absence of European coordination of fiscal policies leads to
excessively tight fiscal stances and too much unemployment throughout
Europe. When a fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy (2~~~~),
non-cooperative fiscal policies are too loose, interest rates too high and
unemployment too low relative to the cooperative outcome.
Comparison of propositions 1 and 2 shows that it is po5sible that a monetary
union yields the opposite result to a clean float. Indeed, Tables 1 and 2
show that for the locomotive case the fiscal stance is, in the absence of
policy coordination, too tight, interest rates too low and unemployment too
high whilst for the beggar-thy-neighbour case one has exactly the opposite.
Tables 1 and 2 show that a non-cooperative monetary union leads to a smaller
welfare loss than a non-cooperative float, and to a larger (smaller) total
welfare loss than a non-cooperative European Monetary System for the
locomotive (beggar-thy-neighbour) case. Table 1 shows that, for the
locomotive case, Germany does better and the rest of Europe does worse under
a cooperative European Monetary System, so it is not clear that Germany has
much incentive to cooperate and give up its hegemony in monetary policy when
setting up a ESCB, unless it receives side-payments from the rest of Europe.
However, Table 2 shows that, for the beggar-thy-neighbour case, Germany
prefers a cooperative monetary union and the rest of Europe prefers a
cooperative European Monetary System so that Germany from the point of view
of fiscal stabilisation would be very keen to give up its hegemony in a
ESCB. As intra-European trade increases, Table 1 is the likely outcome.22
6. Integration of goods markets in Europe
The "1992" plans fcr the completion of a common European market are not
likely to be realised in the next few years, but nevertheless it is of some
interest to examine the effects of an integrated goods market throughout
Europe. A common market implies
yty~ - -or t (lt~)(ftf~-d-d~) (6.1)
and competition leads to the "law of one price", p- p~te. This is formally
equivalent to letting b~. The main implication for the international
coordination of fiscal policies under a clean float is that conflict over
real incomes no longer occurs, so (3.4) becomes w--s. As governments no
longer attempt to export inflation abroad by competitive appreciations of
their currencies, the fiscal stance under a non-cooperative float is always
too tight and unemployment too high relative to the cooperative outcome
(fNFCfCF as S~). The regimes with fixed nominal exchange rates (and nominal
wage rigidity) are not affected by the assumption of integrated goods
markets. Nevertheless, it is easy to show that a non-cooperative float
yields a tighter fiscal stance than a non-cooperative monetary union.
However, the increase in intra-European trade (higher ~) increases, under
the EMS and EMU, the beneficial effects of a fiscal expansion on foreign
activity on net exports abroad compared with the adverse effects through
crowding out, and thus leads to too tight fiscal stances throughout Europe
and implies that Germany has no desire to loose the hegemony it enjoys under
the EMS.
7 Strategic interactions between Europe and the US
Canzoneri and Henderson (198~) and Basevi and Giavazzi (198~) discuss
monetary policy interactions, within the context of a three-country Mundell-
Fleming model, between Europe and the US under floating exchange rates and
find that cooperation within Europe may be counterproductive. Roubini
(198~a,b) uses a similar three-country model of the EMS and the US to
address issues of leadership and policy cooperation. Here the interactions23
between the US and a European Monetary Union are considered. For analytical
convenience, it is assumed that Europe is made up of only two identical
economies, say Germany (1) and France (2), whose combined size exactly
matches the size of the US economy (~). The European Monetary Union fixes
the Deutschemark-franc rate and also fixes the European money supply (mE),
hence any increase in the French money supply must be exactly off-set by an
equal decrease in the German money supply. The US has a fixed money supply
and there is a floating trans-Atlantic exchange rate. Capital markets
throughout the world are fully integrated. It can then be shown that the
model can be summarised by the following reduced-form stabilisation
problems:
Min W1- ~[~(~t2~')fl } 4(~-2~')f2 t~~f~ - yd]2
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where a-a(1-~)~b, ~-(1}~)~~(~t~). ~'-(1-~2)(1-~2)~(1t~2), ~'~1~(1-X2)' ~1
denotes the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to foreign income,
~2 denotes the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to own income for
the US and with respect to the other European country's income for Germany
and France and a denotes the value-share of European (US) goods in total US
(European) expenditures. The first term in each welfare-loss function
reflects the full-employment target, the second term the real-income or
cost-of-living target, and the third term the budgetary-balance target.
Three outcomes are considered:
(i) Global cooperation, that is Germany, France and the US coordinate
their fiscal policies to minimise the global welfare loss (~Wlt
~W2 t ~W~)24
(ii) Cooperation within Europe, that is Germany and France coordinate
their fiscal policies to ,ninimise the European welfare loss (~W1 t
~W2), and Europe and the US behave in a non-cooperative (Nash-
Cournot) fashion.
(iii) There is both an intra-European and a trans-Atlantic failure to
coordinate fiscal policies, so this is a fully non-cooperative
regime with a fixed intra-European exchange rate and a floating
trans-Atlantic exchange rate.
When Europe coordinates its policies, France and Germany can be treated as
one country of the same size as the US. It follows that global cooperation,
(i), corresponds to f3.9)-(3.11), whilst European cooperation, (ii),
corresponds to (3.6)-(3.8). Hence, right-wing preferences imply a too loose
fiscal stance in outcome (ii) relative to outcome (i) and left-wing
preferences imply a too tight fiscal stance and, obviously, outcome (i)
always Pareto-dominates outcomes (ii). In order to assess global non-
cooperation, (iii), it is best to return to the numerical example (the
locomotive case). Table 3 summarises and compares the results for the three
outcomes. Right-wing preferences, where g1-1~(~~a)2-0.694 is satisfied,
implies that cooperation within Europe leads to a looser fiscal stance and
more over-employment in Europe and the US and makes Germany and France
better off and the US worse off. The point is that when neither the European
nor the US governments cooperate, outcome (iii), the US has a looser fiscal
stance than the European economies and thereby is able to appreciate the






cooperation leads to a smaller welfare loss for the US than for the European
countries. Cooperation within Europe aggravates the trans-Atlantic, futile
attempts to appreciate the currency and export inflation, as Europe now acts
as one bloc, and thus leads to looser fiscal stances. Since the US and
Europe are now of equal size, the US can no longer dump inflation on Europe
and therefore the US is worse off and Europe is better off.
However, Table 3 also shows that these results may change for left-wing
preferences (~1-0). When none of the countries cooperate, the US still has a
looser fiscal stance than Europe and now has a larger welfare loss than
Europe. Since left-wing governments do not care about the reduction in the
cost-of-living index associated with a real appreciation of the dollar and25
therefore do not engage so much in competitive and futile attempts to export
inflation, cooperation within Europe dc~s ..~t ~ead to much loosening of
fiscal policy. In fact, Europe loosens its fiscal stance and the US tightens
its fiscal stance. This makes Europe worse off as far as unemployment is
concerned and therefore cooperation within Europe does not pay. Cooperation
within Europe provokes an adverse fiscal response from the US, so that it
increases real income and reduces the cost of living but increases
unemployment. When the latter effect is important, coordination of fiscal
policies within a European Monetary Union may be counterproductive.
8. Indexation of wages to the cost of living
The way the labour market operates is crucial for the own and spill-
over effects of fiscal and monetary policy. So far, nominal wage rigidity
(~-0 and ~-1) has been assumed but for Europe real wage rigidity is probably
more relevant. For example, monetary policy has no real effects in a small
open economy with full indexation (and without capital accumulation and
wealth effects), but is very powerful when nominal wages are rigid in the
short run. In addition, a monetary expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy for low degrees of indexation of wages to the cost of living and a
locomotive policy for high degrees of indexation (Oudiz and Sachs, 1984).
Similarly, a fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy, under floating
exchange rates, for low degrees of indexation and a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy for high degrees of indexation. Hence, whether real or nominal wages
are rigid reverses the spill-over effects of fiscal and monetary policies
and thus makes a lot of difference for recommendations about international
policy coordination.
In order to shed some light on these issues, the effects of real wage
rigidity throughout Europe (~-1) are considered within the context of the
two-country model of Section 2. Aggregate demand is unaffected, but
aggregate supp~y decreases when the wedge between producers' and consumers'
wages increases, i.e., when the tax wedge increases (or productivity
declines) and when the real exchange depreciates (y--~(acts)}. High mobility
of financial assets is ensured when capital controls are abolished and leads26
to convergence of interest rates. This together with equilibrium in all
European goods markets leads to: w-w~-0,
r - r~ - ~[(lt~)(ftf~) } ~(sts~)~~o (8.1)
c - ~[~(s~-s) t (1-~)(f~-f)~~(btas) (8.2)
y - -~s t ~[~~J[~(s-s~) t (1-~)(f-f~)~. (8.3)
A unilateral bond-financed fiscal expansion is partially crowded out by a
rise in interest rates and an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Aggregate supply at home increases, because the fall in import prices
reduces the wedge between consumers' and producers' wages. Abroad the
opposite happens, so foreign aggregate supply falls and thus a fiscal
expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. This results holds irrespective
of the prevailing exchange-rate regime and is the opposite of the standard
Mundell-Fleming result for a clean float. The type of exchange-rate regime
does affect nominal outcomes:
p-p~ - m-m~ t [S ~J
C(1-~)(f~-f) t (b~a)(s-s~)~ (ó.4)
e- m-m~ t 1 [(lt2a )(1- )(f~-f) t(1-2~)~(s~-s)~- (8.5) 2 ~ta~ ~ á
Under a clean float money supplies are fixed, so a home fiscal expansion
leads to a larger appreciation of the nominal than of the real exchange rate
(as p-p~ falls). Under the European Monetary System e and m~ are fixed, so a
fiscal expansion in Germany (the rest of Europe) leads to a contraction
(expansion) of the money supply in the rest of Europe, a real appreciation
(depreciation) of the Deutschemark and an increase (fall) in the relative
price of German goods (p~-p). Under a European Monetary Union e and mE are
fixed, so a fiscal expansion leads to an increase in the home money supply
and an equal fall in the foreign money supply and also to an increase in the
relative price of home products (p-p~). Hence, the effect on the relative
price of home products under the European Monetary System and under monetary
union is the opposite to what it is under a clean float. A joint fiscal
expansion leaves output at home and abroad and exchange rates and relative27
prices unaffected, so that the rise in interest rates and price levels
throughout Europe fully crowds out the increase in demand. Under real wage
rigidity, an adverse supply shock hits unemployment a lot and real incomes
not at all (see Section 2} so that real-income targets (gl) are irrelevant.
The reaction function of each government is upward-sloping, because a
fiscal expansion abroad leads to a depreciation of the home real exchange
rate, an increase in the home wedge and thus a fall in home employment so
that the home government responds with a fiscal expansion. Intersection of
the reaction functions yields the non-cooperative (Nash-Cournot) outcome
fN-fN - ~~a~~(btaR)~(1-~)Yd~g2~0 (8.6)
and yN-yN-O. The cooperative outcome realises that beggar-thy-neighbour
attempts to improve employment at the expense of foreign countries is futile
and leads to fC-fC-O.
Proposition 3: When there is full indexation of wages to the cost of living,
absence of the international coordination of fiscal policy leads to
excessive levels of public sector deficits as governments attempt in vain to
export unemployment. The reason is that the adverse externalities of a
fiscal expansion on foreign employment are not internalised.
It can be shown that, when one country, say France, attaches a higher
priority to full employment than, say, Germany (witness the Mitterrand
Experiment), then France ends up with a higher deficit than Germany and
therefore has less unemployment and an appreciation of its real exchange
rate.
It is also possible to extend the analysis to allow for nominal wage
rigidity in the US and real wage rigidity in Europe (Branson and Rotemberg,
1980; van der Ploeg, 1987). A European fiscal expansion is a locomotive
policy, because the rise in world interest rates exerts an upward pressure
on the US price level, erodes the real value of the US real wage and boosts
US employment. It also leads to an appreciation of the European real
exchange rate, so that it increases real incomes in Europe and decreases
real incomes in the US. A US fiscal expansion has ambiguous effects on28
European employment, but in the normal case that it leads to an appreciation
of the US real exchange rate it is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy 7. An
increase in the European money supply has no real effects; it simply leads
to one-for-one increase in European prices. A US monetary expansion is a
locomotive policy, because the associated fall in the value of the dollar
reduces the wedge between consumers' and producers' wages in Europe and
increases European unemployment. A global adverse supply shock increases
unemployment in Europe much more than in the US. In the absence of
international policy coordination, the US (Europe) ignores the beneficial
effects on European (US) employment of an increase in the money supply (a
fiscal expansion). Hence, the US will have a too tight monetary policy and
Europe will have a too tight fiscal policy. When a US fiscal expansion is a
beggar-thy-neighbour policy, it will typícally have a too loose fiscal
stance as it does not internalise the adverse effects on Europe. This
explains why much of the debate around the G3- and G7-summits in the
eighties advised the US to tighten its fiscal policy and loosen its monetary
policy and Europe to loosen its fiscal policy. Implementation of part of
this advice explains the coordinated fall of the real and nominal value of
the dollar since the New York Plaza Summit in 1985, although the adjustments
in fiscal policy have not been far-reaching enough to get rid of European
unemployment.
9. Concluding remarks
Table 4 presents a summary of the own and spill-over effects of fiscal
and monetary policy under alternative exchange-rate regimes. Two-country
models with perfect mobility of financial assets and unemployment caused by
nominal wage rigidity under floating exchange rates, under the European
Monetary System with German hegemony, and under European Monetary Union were
7 This happens when the negative effects of financial crowding out on
European consumption and investment dominate the positive effects of US
activity on European net exports (if o~~~).29
considered. Under floating exchange rates a fiscal expansion is a locomotive
policy as far as foreign employment and output is concerned and a beggar-
thy-neighbour policy as far as foreign real income or the cost of living is
concerned. It~follows that a right-wing government responds to a foreign
fiscal contraction with a fiscal contraction whilst a left-wing government
responds with a fiscal expansion. International policy coordination under
floating exchange rates, in the face of a common adverse supply shock,
implies that right-wing governments. mainly concerned with the cost of
living, tighten their fiscal stance whilst left-wing governments, mainly
concerned with full employment, loosen their, fiscal stance. The European
Monetary System is assumed to be characterised by German hegemony, that is
the Bundesbank sets the German money supply wtiílst tlle other European
central banks peg their currencies to the Deutschemark. A fiscal expansion
in countries other than Germany is a locomotive policy, because it raises
employment and output throughout Europe. A German fiscal expansion, however,
is less of a locomotive policy and can, when the fall in non-German money
supplies is large enough, be a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Hence, Germany
always responds with a fiscal contraction to a fiscal expansion elsewhere in
Europe whilst the rest of Europe responds, when a German fiscal expansion is
a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, with a fiscal expansion. Hence. in a non-
cooperative European Monetary System Germany always has a tighter fiscal
stance than the rest of Europe and, when a German fiscal expansion is a
locomotive policy, all coucitries in Europe will have a too tight fiscal
stance relative to the cooperative outcome irrespective of their
preferences. In that case, whicli is more likely as intra-European trade
increases, the European Monetary System ttas a built-in deflationary bias in
fiscal policies. Tt~is means that Germany has a greater incentive to
cooperate in the European Monetary System than the rest of Europe. liowever.,
if a German fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. German fiscal
policy may be too loose and the rest of Europe has a greater incentive to
cooperate in the European Monetary System. Since the European Monetary
System avoids the conflict inherent in competitive appreciations and
exporting inflation, it is nevertheless typically superior to floating
intra-European exchange rates. A European Monetary Union is a symmetric
exchange-rate arrangement without German hegemony in monetary policy, so
that the ESCB fixes the European money supply. In a European Monetary Union30
a fiscal expansion can, in contrast to floating exchange rates, be a beggar-
thy-neighbour policy. When this is the case, a non-cooperative European
Monetary Union lPads to too loose fiscal stances. However, when intra-
European trade increases, fiscal expansions are more likely to be locomotive
policies and thus fiscal stances are too tight in the absence of
international policy coordination. The main advantage of a European Monetary
Union, as it is for the EMS, is that it avoids the conflict inherent in
exporting inflation. However, when intra-European trade is substantial
(insignificant}, a German fiscal expansion is a locomotive (beggar-thy-
neighbour) policy, Germany does better (worse) and the rest of Europe does
worse (better) under a cooperative EMS rather than under a cooperative EMU.
Hence, it is doubtful (clear) that Germany has much incentive to cooperate
and give up its hegemony when setting up the ESCB. McKibbin and Sachs
(1986a,b) use their empirical multi-country model to argue that a regime of
fixed exchange rates works well for global shocks but not necessarily well
for country-specific shocks. Hence. the choice of an international exchange-
rate regime depends crucially on the source of origin and nature of the
shocks hitting the world economy as well as on the nature of the preferences
of the various governments.
When one allows for interactions between the US and the countries
making up a European Monetary Union, it follows that under global non-
cooperation the US exploits the smaller size of the European economies by
appreciating the real value of the dollar and exporting inflation to Europe.
The US does this by having a looser fiscal stance than the European
economies. When fiscal policies in Europe are coordinated, the US can no
longer employ this tactic and thus Europe has a lower cost of living and
higher real income than before. However, the US now has a tighter fiscal
stance than before and therefore unemployment throughout the world is
higher. Hence, coordination of fiscal policy within Europe can be
counterproductive, especially when governments care a great deal about
unemployment.
Empirical evidence suggests the importance of indexation of nominal
wages to cost-of-living indices for Europe and Japan. This suggests that for
Europe a depreciation of its real exchange rate raises the wedge between
producers' and consumers' wages and thus reduces aggregate supply and that
adverse supply shocks (such as the OPEC oil-price hikes in the seventies)31
affected Europe much more badly than the US. The main implication of a
Europe with full indexation is that, as far as real outcomes such as
unemployment and output are concerned, monetary policy has no efffects and
therefore the particular exchange-rate regime (EMS, EMU, etc.) in force has
no effects. A fiscal expansion is always a beggar-thy-neighbour policy,
because it leads to a depreciation of the foreign real exchange rate and a
fall in foreign supply. It follows that in the absence of international
policy coordination fiscal policy is too tight. Under real wage rigidity
common adverse demand shocks do not affect unemployment, although common
adverse supply shocks increase unemployment throughout Europe.
When the US has nominal wage rigidity and Europe has real wage
rigidity, a US monetary expansion and a European fiscal expansion are
locomotive policies. A US fiscal expansion is, typically, a beggar-thy-
neighbour policy, because the negative effects of financial crowding on
European consumption and investment typically dominate the positive spill-
over effects of US activity on European exports (as trans-Atlantic trade is
relatively insignificant). Also, OPEC oil-price shocks hit Europe much
harder than the US. It is then not surprising that, in the aftermath of the
OPEC oil-price shocks and in the absence of international policy
coordination, the European fiscal stance has been too tight, the US fiscal
stance has been too loose and the US monetary stance has been too tight. All
of these policies have contributed to the rise in European unemployment in
the early eighties and they explain why most of the trans-Atlantic policy
debates urge the US to contract demand and Europe to expand demand.
Future research on fiscal aspects of monetary integration should also
focus on idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks as these may require an
adjustment of the exchange rate. This is not feasible under a monetary
union, so a greater call must be made on fiscal policy. The doubling of
regional and structural funds proposed by the Delors Committee does not
really cope with this adjustment problem. More generally, the intertemporal
aspects of the government budget constraint and the current account deserve
more attention. Countries with a large surplus on the current account and a
low government debt, such as Germany, should play a greater role in a
coordinated supply-friendly demand expansion for Europe (Drèze and Wyplosz,
1g88), so that some allowance must be made in future work for differences in32
public sector finances and current accounts between countries as well.
Another important issue is the problem of the trade-off between seigniorage
revenues, tax revenues and debt policy. Canzoneri and Rogers (1988) show
that the presence of a larger informal economy in southern Europe justifies,
from a public-finance point of view, a higher inflation rate for southern
Europe than for northern Europe. In that case, one could argue for a
crawling peg between northern and southern Europe (Dornbusch, 1988; van der
Ploeg, 1989). However, Gros (1988) argues that governments of countries with
a large public nominal debt, such as Italy, have a big temptation to use
surprise inflation to erode the real value of debt. In equilibrium the
private sector anticipates this temptation and this results in higher than
optimal inflation, but the EMS eliminates this inefficiency and may thus be
optimal even though it reduces the revenues from seigniorage. Future
research should also be directed at incentive and supply-side effects of
harmonisation of various taxes (Keen, 1989; Frenkel, Razin and Symansky,
1989; Razin and Sadka, 1989). In addition, research may be directed at the
effects of coordination of fiscal policies for the tasks of allocation and
distribution as well as for stabilisation.
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University.Table 1: Fiscal Stances, Unemployment Rates and Welfare Losses under Alternative Exchange-Rate Regimes
A substantial degree of intra-European trade
Germany Rest of Europe
E h R R i t xc ange me a e eg
Fiscal Unemployment Welfare Fiscal Unemployment Welfare
Stance (f~) Rate (yd-y~) Loss ( W~) Stance ( f) Rate (yd-y) Loss (W)
European Monetary
System.~
Non-Cooperative 0.130 0.195 0.5276 0.153 0.184 0.5287
Cooperative 0.143 0.176 0.5258 0.187 0.154 0.5293
European Monetary
Union-~~
Non-Cooperative 0.143 0.190 0.5283 0.143 0.190 0.5283
Cooperative 0.167 0.167 0.5278 0.167 0.167 0.5278
European Float:~~~
Non-Cooperative 0.511 -0.178 0.6464 0.511 -0.178 0.6464
Parameters: a-0.5, ~-0.5, ~-0.5. a-0.8, ~-2, (~-1, b-1~3), ~1-~2-1.
~ A German fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy in the EMS.
~~ A fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy under EMU.
~~~ A cooperative regime of floating intra-European exchange-rates yields exactly the same outcome as a
cooperative monetary union in Europe.Table 2: Fiscal Stances, Unemployment Rates and Welfare Losses under Alternative Exchange-Rate Regimes
An insignificant degree of intra-European trade
Germany Rest of Europe
Exchange Rate Regime
Fiscal Unemployment Welfare Fiscal Unemployment Welfare
Stance ( f~) Rate ( yd-y~) Loss ( W~) Stance (f) Rate (yd-y) Loss (W)
European Monetary
System.~
Non-Cooperative 0.366 0.467 0.6761 0.370 0.464 0.6759
Cooperative 0.297 0.520 0.6794 0.383 0.443 0.6714
European Monetary
Union.~~
Non-Cooperative 0.392 0.445 0.6757 0.392 0.445 0.6757
Cooperative 0.387 0.449 0.6756 0.387 0.449 0.6756 ~
European Float:~~~
Non-Cooperative 0.824 0.074 0.8419 0.824 0.074 0.8419
Parameters: 6-0.5, ~-0.5, ~-0.1, a-0.8, ~-2, (G-5~9, á-5~11), 81-~2-1.
~ A German fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the EMS.
~~ A fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy under EMU.
~~~ A cooperative regime of floating intra-European exchange-rates yields exactly the same outcome as a


















(i) Global Cooperation 0.167 0.167 0 0.5278 0.167 0.167 0 0.5278
(ii) Cooperation within Europe 0.511 -0.178 0
i
0 .6464 ~ 0.511 -0 .178 0 0.6464
(iii) Global Non-Cooperation 0.308 -0.069 -0.113 I
I
0.66g4 ~ 0.497 -0.069 0.113 0.5192
LEFT-WING GOVERNMENTS f yd-y
~
w-pc ~ W f~ Yd-Y~
,~
w~-pc W~
(i) Global Cooperation 0.167 0.167 0 0.0278 0.167 0.167 0 0.0278
(ii) Cooperation within Europe 0.111 0.222 0 0.0309 0.111 0.222 0 0.0309
(iii) Global Non-Cooperation 0.087 0.232 -0.017 I 0.0307 0.116 0.232 0.017 0.0336
Parameters: ~-0.5, 5- 0.5, ~-0.5, a-0.8, ~-2, (0-1, ~-1~3), g1-1 (right-wing), g1-0 (left-wing), g2-1, ~1-0.25, ~2-0.5,
~-1, ~~-0.25Table 4: International Interdependence under Alternative Exchange-Rate Regimes ~
,r ~
t t - t t - n.a.
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n. a. 0 t
m f - ? ? n.a. 1 }
European Monetary
Union: NWR~NWR~
y } ~~~~ - ? n.a. n.a. t
w-pc 0 0 - - n.a. n.a. t
Europe: RWR~RWR~
~ Europe with RWR~RWR~ is relevant for any exchange-rate regime, whether the
EMU, EMS or floating intra-European exchange rates. For the second trans-
Atlantic model home is Europe and abroad is the US, whilst for the EMS
abroad is Germany and the rest of Europe is home.
}} Positive if o C~~ and negative otherwise.
~}} Positive if e~ 2~~ and negative otherwise.niiWU~ó~~u~ui~iiii~iii~uu